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NEW YORK AND DIVORCE: FINDING FAULT 
IN A NO FAULT SYSTEM 
Lauren Guidice 
INTRODUCTION 
As the millions of children of “fault” divorces in New York 
can attest, the damage involved in declaring fault in order to 
dissolve a marriage is palpable and enduring. Many are not old 
enough to understand why the intricate process may take years to 
complete, or why their mothers assert “cruel and inhuman” 
treatment when their fathers never seemed like the monster that 
phrase made him out to be. For over two decades, New York 
remained stuck in an archaic fault-based system1—requiring 
couples to point fingers and air dirty laundry in order to divorce—
while the rest of the country progressed and developed unilateral 
divorce systems.2  
The fault requirement of the dissolution of marriage in New 
York has long been considered to be unnecessary and damaging.3 
                                                          
 J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School 2012; B.A., Fordham University 2008. I 
would like to thank my family and friends for their constant support, particularly 
my parents, who taught me that divorce and family are not incompatible. I 
would also like to thank my editors for their insights throughout the writing and 
editing of this Note. 
1 See The Editors, Is New York Ready for No-Fault Divorce?, N.Y. TIMES 
ROOM FOR DEBATE BLOG (June 15, 2010), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2010/06/15/is-new-york-ready-for-no-fault-divorce/ (stating that “New 
York was the longtime holdout [on no-fault divorce], since South Dakota passed 
its law in 1985”).   
2 South Dakota was the second-to-last state to pass a no-fault divorce law in 
1985. SL 1985, ch. 207 § 1; See also, The Editors, supra note 1.  
3 Hon. Sondra Miller, The Commission’s Process and Recommendations: 
Symposium on the Miller Commission on Matrimonial Law, 27 PACE L. REV. 
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The looming threat of a fault trial can harm the children of divorce 
by dragging out proceedings and airing allegations of marital fault, 
many of which are untrue.4 Additionally, scholars and practitioners 
criticize the fault requirement for adding unnecessary expense to 
the already financially taxing experience of divorce.5 Though fault 
trials are rare,6 they can last from two days to several weeks.7 As 
supervising judge of the matrimonial division in Nassau County, 
Judge Robert A. Ross, said, “[fault trials] are never pleasant.”8  
On August 15, 2010, in response to decades of proposals and 
complaints, Governor Patterson signed a three-bill package that 
overhauled New York divorce laws.9 The package places New 
York’s divorce laws on equal footing with that of the forty-nine 
other states that do not require fault in order for a couple to 
dissolve their marriage.10  The reform comes twenty-five years 
after South Dakota, the most recent state to pass a no-fault divorce 
                                                          
551, 551–53 (2007). 
4 Id. “The Commission recognized the need to change the very culture of 
the system and to make explicit recommendations to reduce trauma, cost and 
delay.” Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Nassau County Judge Robert A. Ross stated in an interview with 
Bloomberg News that he presided over eight to twelve “fault” trials per year. 
Carolyn Kolker & Patricia Hurtado, Divorce Easier as New York Law Ends 
Need to Lie, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2010-08-16/breaking-up-not-so-hard-to-do-as-new-york-s-divorce-law-
ends-need-to-lie.html. Robert S. Cohen, a divorce lawyer known for 
representing famous clients, such as model Christie Brinkley and actor James 
Gandolfini, noted that in his thirty years of practice he only “handled four fault 
trials.” Id.  
7 Id.  
8 Id. (quoting Nassau County Judge Robert A. Ross, who stated, in regards 
to the “horrible” nature of fault trials: “You may have friends called, girlfriends 
and boyfriends called, people who are alleged to be girlfriends and boyfriends . . 
. [h]aving to listen to these things can sometimes be an overwhelming 
experience”). 
9 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (McKinney 2010); See also Denise M. 
Champagne, Devil’s in the Details of No-Fault Divorce in New York, DAILY 
RECORD, July 14, 2010.  
10 Champagne, supra note 9.    
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law, did so in 1985.11 The bill encountered significant setbacks 
during its passage through the State Legislature and prior to 
gaining the endorsement of Governor Patterson.12 As Governor 
Patterson noted at the signing of the three-bill package, the reform 
brings New York divorce laws “into the twenty-first century.”13  
Prior to the passage of this law,14 divorce in New York was a 
long and contentious process that could not be achieved 
unilaterally.15 The closest that parties could get to a “no-fault” 
option was to mutually agree to a divorce, submit to a “trial” 
separation, and then convert that separation into a divorce after one 
year of living apart.16  If a couple could not mutually agree to a 
divorce, then they would have to seek a divorce on fault-based 
grounds.17 Such “fault” options included adultery, cruel and 
inhuman treatment, abandonment, and constructive 
                                                          
11 Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership, and Divorce 
Discourse, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1513, 1538 (2005) (“In 1985, South Dakota became 
the last state to adopt a no-fault divorce ground.”). 
12 Id. (noting that the current bill’s passage through the Senate in June 2010 
marked the best chance “in more than two decades” of passing a no-fault 
divorce provision).  
13 Press Release, New York State Office of The Governor, Governor 
Patterson Acts on 137 Bills; Vetoes 34 Bills Worth More Than $22.9 Million in 
Additional Spending (Aug. 15, 2010), available at http://readme.readmedia. 
com/Governor-Paterson-Acts-on-137-Bills-Vetoes-34-Bills-Worth-More-Than-
22-9-Million -in-Additional-Spending/1694112.  
14 N.Y. DOM. REL. § 170(7) (McKinney 2010) (amending New York’s 
domestic relations law to add subsection 7 allowing for divorce on the grounds 
of irretrievable breakdown of marital relationship).  
15 Section 170(5) of New York’s Domestic Relations Law requires a couple 
to live apart pursuant to a separation judgment or decree for a period of one or 
more years and show “satisfactory proof” that they have substantially performed 
the terms and conditions of the judgment or decree before they will be granted a 
divorce. N.Y. DOM. REL. § 170(5) (McKinney 2010). Similarly, section 170(6) 
requires a husband and wife to live apart for a period of at least one year 
pursuant to a written agreement of separation before they will be issued a 
divorce. Id. See also Joel Stashenko, No Fault Companion Bill on Maintenance 
Raises New Concerns, 244 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2010).   
16 N.Y. DOM. REL. §§ 170(5)–(6) (McKinney 2010). 
17 Id.   
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abandonment.18 This route typically involved extended and costly 
litigation, at the end of which a divorce was not even guaranteed.19 
At other times, couples and their attorneys would resort to outright 
perjury in order to establish the requisite “fault” necessary for a 
divorce.20  
Under the new divorce law, divorce can be granted to an 
unhappy spouse who declares under oath that his or her marriage 
has been “irretrievably” broken for at least six months.21 Other 
issues related to the divorce, such as child custody and distribution 
of property, must be resolved by the parties or determined by the 
court before a divorce will officially be granted.22  
The State Legislature also passed two divorce finance reforms 
that will affect post-divorce maintenance awards.23 The 
amendments to sections 237(a), 237(b), and 238 provide that the 
spouse with the greater economic worth will pay for attorney’s 
fees, expert fees, and any additional costs, disbursements, or 
                                                          
18 Id.   
19 Joel Stashenko, No Fault Divorce Signed Into Law, 12 N.Y. FAM. L. 
MONTHLY # (2010) (New York “[j]udges have frequently been forced to reject 
petitions for divorce”). 
20 Champagne, supra note 9 (“[I]ndividuals have been known to fabricate 
allegations in order to establish grounds”); In 1934, the New York Mirror 
created a sensation with its series, “I Was the Unknown Blonde in 100 New 
York Divorces!” (discussing the way in which New York lawyers worked 
around the adultery-only divorce grounds prior to divorce reform in 1960). J. 
Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform Has 
Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 571–72 (2007).   
21 2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 384 (McKinney 2010), adding section 170(7) 
to New York Domestic Relations Law which reads as follows:  
The relationship between husband and wife has broken down 
irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one party 
has so stated under oath. No judgment of divorce shall be granted under 
this subdivision unless and until the economic issues of equitable 
distribution of marital property, the payment or waiver of spousal 
support, the payment of child support, the payment of counsel and 
expert’s fees and expenses as well as the custody and visitation with the 
infant children of the marriage have been resolved by the parties, or 
determined by the Court and incorporated into the judgment of divorce.  
22 Id.    
23 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 237(a)–(b), 238 (McKinney 2010). 
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expenses.24 Further, the amendments to Domestic Relations Law 
section 236 will govern the provision of temporary maintenance in 
matrimonial actions.25 The new amendments took effect on 
October 12, 2010.26  
The passage of a no-fault cause of action for divorce and a new 
maintenance formula raise the specter of a judicial process in 
which fault does not play a role. However, couples divorce for 
independent and varied reasons—no two divorces are alike.27 If 
divorce law is to “do justice,”28 fault should matter in the division 
of assets, even where it is properly excluded from the reasons for 
divorce. By allowing fault to be taken into account when 
determining maintenance awards, New York courts would 
maintain the requisite authority to provide equitable post-divorce 
settlements regardless of which party desired the divorce.  
Further, divorce cannot be granted under the new law until 
issues such as equitable distribution, spousal maintenance, child 
support, counsel and expert fees, child custody, and visitation are 
either resolved by the parties or determined by the court.29 Thus, in 
order to protect themselves from the “one-size fits all” divorce that 
can occur in no-fault jurisdictions, New Yorkers should enter into 
premarital agreements.30 In an age where divorce proceedings have 
                                                          
24 Id.  
25 “Temporary maintenance” is the term used for the monetary support 
provided during the interim of a matrimonial action. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 
(McKinney 2010).   
26 2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 384 (McKinney 2010). In order to study the 
effects of the new temporary maintenance formula, a Commission was set up 
and will submit its findings to the state legislature sometime in mid-2011. 
Stashenko, supra note 15 (“The Law Revision Commission will study the 
setting of maintenance levels statewide to determine if courts are failing to take 
into account financial factors that could unfairly disadvantage one spouse or 
another.”).   
27 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Often, There is Fault, N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR 
DEBATE BLOG (June 15, 2010), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/ 
06/15/is-new-york-ready-for-no-fault-divorce.   
28 Id.    
29 N.Y. DOM. REL. § 170(7).  
30 Or, post-marital agreements, which are entered into by couples that are 
already married and wish to negotiate the terms of their divorce. 41 AM. JUR. 2D 
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become more and more streamlined, premarital agreements offer 
New Yorkers the most equitable solution to an increasingly 
litigation-less area of the law.  
Part I of this Note will explore the historical development of 
divorce law by examining the traditional fault based divorce law 
and the subsequent movement away from the law in other 
jurisdictions. Part II will discuss the fault-based system under New 
York’s former Domestic Relations Law and address the 
inadequacies of the fault based divorce system. Part III will 
examine the subsequent changes that will occur as a result of New 
York’s divorce reform bill, including no-fault divorce and divorce 
finance changes. This section will explore the implications of no-
fault divorce laws on maintenance,31 including how the new 
formula provides for calculating temporary maintenance awards 
under New York’s new no-fault divorce reform package, and how 
that will affect the parties to divorce.32 Additionally, this section 
will address the possible financial effect New York’s divorce laws 
will have on couples seeking to divorce. Part IV will address 
potential inadequacies in the new divorce law, and recommend 
both judicial prescriptions and precautionary measures that should 
be taken by spouses prior to entering into marriage. Ultimately, 
this Note maintains that fault should play a role in maintenance 
proceedings and the distribution of marital property. Following the 
example of many other states,33 New York should allow marital 
misconduct to be taken into account in determining maintenance 
awards and the division of property.  
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DIVORCE LAW 
Divorce law developed rapidly throughout the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Viewed in much the same light as 
                                                          
Husband and Wife § 107.  
31 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (b)(1) (McKinney 2010). 
32 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 2010) (Amendments to section 
236 of New York Domestic Relations Law were enacted, governing the 
provision of temporary maintenance in matrimonial actions).  
33 See generally A.B.A., Alimony/Spousal Support Factors, 42 FAM. L.Q. 
757 (2009).  
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tort actions, divorce was seen as a remedy for those spouses who 
had been wronged by their partner.34 Thus, the fault-based divorce 
system was the dominant scheme in most jurisdictions until the 
mid-twentieth century.35 However, as social values and mores 
changed, strict fault-based divorce regimes were replaced by 
unilateral, no-fault systems.36 By 1985, almost every jurisdiction in 
the United States had a unilateral divorce system in place. The 
singular exception to this overwhelming support for unilateral 
divorce was New York.  
A. Traditional Fault Based Divorce 
Divorce was not recognized under English common law until 
the mid-nineteenth century, when divorce jurisdiction was 
removed from the ecclesiastical courts to the civil court system.37 
At that time, divorces were only granted in cases of adultery.38 By 
the late nineteenth century, the laws regulating marriage and 
divorce in the United States varied drastically among the states.39 
Though the laws differed, each jurisdiction recognized divorce or 
judicial separation on limited grounds—all of which involved 
some degree of fault.40 Although the most frequently used grounds 
for divorce were “[a]dultery, extreme cruelty, or desertion,” many 
states permitted “insanity, conviction of a crime, habitual 
drunkenness and drug addiction” to be used as grounds for 
divorce.41  
                                                          
34 Michelle L. Evans, Wrongs Committed During a Marriage: The Child 
that No Area of the Law Wants to Adopt, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465, 473–73 
(2009).  
35 JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 237 (3d 
ed. 2005).  
36 See generally NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A 
HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES (Greenwood Press 1977) (1962).  
37 See LYNN CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND 
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 12–17 (1980).  
38 Evans, supra note 34, at 472.   
39 BLAKE, supra note 36, 116–29. 
40 Id. (noting the differences in approaches to divorce that were adopted).  
41 GREGORY ET AL., supra note 35, at 237. 
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Under the fault-based system, the primary concern was “the 
strong public interest in preserving marriage.”42 The system was 
founded on the belief that requiring proof of fault would limit 
access to divorce and further the state’s interest in preserving 
marriages.43 Divorce was “conceived as a remedy for the innocent 
against the guilty.”44 This strict notion of “wrong-versus-right” led 
many courts to refuse to grant divorce in cases where both parties 
were guilty of marital misconduct.45  
The limited availability of divorce began to wane in the second 
half of the twentieth century as jurisdictions across the country 
began to authorize divorce without regard to fault.46  
Nevertheless, New York’s general divorce law, which solely 
allowed for divorce on the ground of adultery, remained “immune 
to revision.”47 Attempts to reform New York laws by broadening 
the grounds for divorce were continuously defeated.48 However, by 
1930 the New York Legislature had successfully defined five 
grounds for annulment: infancy,49 bigamy, lunacy and idiocy, force 
or fraud, and physical incapacity (impotence).50  
B. The Emergence of No-Fault Divorce 
The limited availability of divorce left many couples trapped in 
                                                          
42 Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 
1442, 1471 (1992).  
43 Evans, supra note 34, at 473.   
44 Brewies v. Brewies, 178 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944) (holding 
that a divorce ordinarily will not be granted where both parties are equally at 
fault).  
45 The result that occurs is ironic: when both parties have a ground for a 
divorce, neither has a right to divorce. Id. See generally J.W. Bunkley, The 
Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce Law, 20 MISS. L.J. 327 (1948). This was 
known as the doctrine of recrimination. Id.   
46 GREGORY ET AL., supra note 35, at 237 (discussing the collapse of 
conventional divorce law and the development of no-fault divorce laws).  
47 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 564.  
48 BLAKE, supra note 36, at 201–04. Between 1900 and 1933, over fifteen 
bills were sponsored and rejected. Id. at 201.  
49 Being under the age of consent.  
50 BLAKE, supra note 36, at 66–67. 
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irretrievably broken marriages.51 Over time, the fault-based 
divorce system led to the widespread corruption of the family law 
system, which legislatures and judges across the nation had come 
to ignore.52 Unhappy couples resorted to collusion—fabricating 
evidence of marital misconduct in order to establish the requisite 
ground upon which divorce could be granted.53 In a notorious 
example, Dorothy Jarvis was hired in over one-hundred divorce 
cases to play the role of “the other woman.”54 Jarvis staged 
adulterous hotel rendezvous with New York husbands.55 A 
photographer would catch the “adulterous couple,” thus providing 
the necessary evidence for the unhappily married New Yorkers to 
obtain a divorce.56  
Eventually, the widespread practice of “collusion and 
perjury”57 by couples wishing to divorce challenged the legitimacy 
of the family law system.58 In response, California enacted the 
country’s first no-fault divorce law.59 Signed by Governor Ronald 
Reagan in 1969,60 this revolutionary legislation inspired similar 
                                                          
51 Sullivan v. Sullivan, 689 N.Y.S.2d 378, 382 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 
1999) (stating that a divorce will not be granted on the grounds that the marital 
relationship is irretrievably broken and lost).  
52 See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 35, at 236–38.  
53 Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice 
Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1512–13 (2000) (explaining the concept 
of collusion and its widespread use in the practice of divorce law prior to the 
introduction of no-fault rules).  
54 BLAKE, supra note 36, at 193. 
55 Id.  
56 Friedman, supra note 53, at 1512–13.   
57 Id. at 1506–07. In the early twentieth century a Massachusetts judge 
claimed, “[t]here [was] probably no tribunal in the country in which perjury was 
more rife than in the Divorce Court.” HENRY EDWIN FENN, THIRTY-FIVE YEARS 
IN THE DIVORCE COURT 139 (1911).  
58 Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce in the United States, in CROSS CURRENTS: 
FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE US AND ENGLAND 341, 341 (Sanford N. Katz, 
et al. eds., 2000) (“The entire package of [fault-based divorce] rules encouraged 
the very sham that the collusion doctrine ineffectually sought to suppress.”). 
59 See Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608, § 4506, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3314, 
3324 (current version at Cal. Fam. Code § 2310 (West 2011)).  
60 See generally ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, DIVORCE REFORM IN 
CALIFORNIA: FROM FAULT TO NO-FAULT…AND BACK AGAIN? (Nov. 6, 1997), 
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changes across the country as the no-fault approach grew in 
popularity.61  
By the mid-1980s, all states had some form of a no-fault 
provision integrated into their divorce law.62 Most states enacted 
no-fault divorce laws that cited “irreconcilable differences” or 
“irretrievable breakdown” as the basis for marital dissolution.63 
Neutral grounds for dissolving marriage reduced the moral stigma 
associated with divorce.64 In addition, a large majority of no-fault 
regimes began to permit unilateral divorce.65  
Social scientists studying family relationships in the middle of 
the twentieth century suggested that “marriages broke up in [the] 
context of conflicts in attitude, personality, or other difficulty on 
both sides, rather than as a result of fault by one spouse and 
innocence by the other.”66 Advocates of no-fault divorce relied on 
this proposition to bolster the argument that traditional grounds for 
divorce (i.e., adultery, desertion, etc.) were symptoms of a 
deteriorating marriage rather than the causes.67 It was argued that 
                                                          
available at http://www.library.co.gov/crb/98/04/currentstate.pdf. The 1969 
statute read: “A Court may decree a dissolution of the marriage or legal 
separation on either of the following grounds, which shall be pleaded generally: 
(1) [i]rreconcilable differences, which have caused the irremediable breakdown 
of marriage[;] (2) [i]ncurable insanity.” 1969 Cal. Stat. 1608 (current version at 
Cal. Fam. Code § 2310 (West 2011)).  
61 GREGORY ET AL., supra note 35, at 237 (describing California’s divorce 
reform law as the forefront of the “divorce revolution”).  
62 Either as the sole basis for divorce or as an alternative to the traditional 
fault based system. See Evans, supra note 34, at 474. See also Scheu v. Vargas, 
778 N.Y.S.2d 663, 663 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (stating that, in New York, no-fault 
divorce applies only where there is a previous decree of separation or a written 
separation agreement, as required by the Domestic Relations Law provision 
listing grounds for divorce; otherwise, a divorce may be granted only if fault is 
established pursuant to one or more of the grounds set forth in the provision). 
63 Evans, supra note 34, at 474.   
64 Id.   
65 This meant that one spouse could terminate the marriage without the 
consent of the other. Michael Grossberg, How to Give the Present a Past? 
Family Law in the United States 1950-2000, in CROSS CURRENTS, supra note 
58, at 3, 7.    
66 Id. at 18. 
67 Id. at 17–18. 
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parties should not be required to assert such symptoms in order to 
finalize a divorce when the causes of the breakdown were often 
multifarious and equally distributed between the parties.68  
In the wake of California’s “legal and cultural 
transformation,”69 no-fault divorce reform quickly became a 
prevalent topic in family law discourse throughout the country.70 In 
1969, the same year as California’s groundbreaking divorce 
reform, the Federal Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 
(“UMDA”) was approved,71 which called for irretrievable 
breakdown of the marriage to be the sole ground of divorce.72 
Federal encouragement of no-fault divorce practices along with the 
independent adoption of no-fault divorce regimes among the states 
highlights the (almost) universal belief that the fault requirement to 
the dissolution of marriage was outdated and unnecessary. 
However, despite the fact that every jurisdiction in the country 
would adopt unilateral divorce systems throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, it would take New York nearly a half-century to follow 
suit.73  
C. Why Change Took So Long In New York 
In the years leading up to the present overhaul of its divorce 
laws, New York remained unable to advance past legislative 
wrangling into legislative action.74 New York’s inaction can be 
attributed in part to the influence of the Catholic Church and to the 
                                                          
68 Id. 
69 James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriages, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 907 
(2000).  
70 See ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 60, at 132 (1997) 
(describing California’s passage of a no-fault option as the launch of a “legal 
revolution”). 
71 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 302 (1970). Although only eight 
states have adopted the UMDA—Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington, “the act has greatly influenced 
the terms of divorce reform for many states.” DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, 
at n.223.   
72 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 302 (1970). 
73 THE EDITORS, supra note 1. 
74 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 567.   
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many dedicated women’s organizations in the legislature.75 Such 
forces underlie the main reason for New York’s delayed progress 
in divorce reform, which was simply that it was decades behind the 
rest of the country.76  
New York deferred divorce reform legislation several times 
between 1900 and 1960.77 Scholars have suggested that the 
“stubborn adhesion” of New York’s lawmakers to a single ground 
for divorce reflected “not so much a stern sense of duty as an 
inability to give the problem of marital law more than fitful 
attention.”78 Distracted by social and religious forces, decades of 
World Wars, and economic depression, New York legislators stood 
stagnant on the issue of divorce reform.79  
By the 1950s, New York had the “lowest recorded divorce rate 
in the country.”80 However, the frequency of annulments,81 
migratory divorce,82 separations, and desertions combined to 
increase the state’s total marital disruption far beyond the national 
average.83 In the 1960s, “this dichotomy between ‘law-as-statute 
                                                          
75 See generally id.    
76 See generally id.    
77 BLAKE, supra note 36, at 64–79.  
78 Id. at 64.  
79 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 567. Between the years 1900 and 
1933, fifteen different legislators sponsored bills to modernize New York’s 
divorce law by adding grounds such as cruelty and desertion. BLAKE, supra note 
36, at 201. However, each bill was “buried in committee.” Id.  
80 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 576.  
81 New York had the nation’s highest annulment rate, comprising 
approximately one-third of all annulments in the United States. HERBERT JACOB, 
SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES 35 (1988).  
82 The practice of leaving one’s state or country in order to take advantage 
of more lenient divorce laws and secure a divorce. BLAKE, supra note 36, at 1–
4, 152–59.  
83 Unhappy New Yorkers were willing, in significant numbers, to leave 
home to get divorced. DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 576. By 1922, 
scholars noted that nearly one-third of all New York divorces had been obtained 
out of state. Id. Because of Constitutional full-faith and credit requirements, 
New York Courts accepted these out of state divorces so long as both parties 
were present. Id. at 573. And, for those New Yorkers who could not afford to 
leave the state in order to end their marriages, annulments provided another 
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and law-in-action’”84 eventually proved to be too much for the 
New York Legislature.85  
New York’s first major divorce reform occurred as a result of a 
1961 report by the Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial 
and Family Laws.86 Known as the “Wilson Committee,”87 the 
group discovered what Family Law judges and practitioners had 
long known; the State’s formal divorce law had “spawned a set of 
practices inconsistent with any notions of sound public policy.”88 
The Committee realized that by framing the need for divorce 
reform in such a way as to stress the “public policy need for 
consistency between the law in practice and the law as written,” it 
could successfully evade the moral debate of divorce itself.89  
The subsequent divorce reforms—New York’s first—occurred 
in 1966.90 The new law provided for divorce on the grounds of 
adultery, cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment for two or 
more years, confinement in prison for three or more years, or 
living apart for a period of two years or more pursuant to an 
                                                          
route to dissolving their unions. In New York, annulments accounted for 25% of 
marital dissolutions during World War II and nearly 50% after 1950. Id. at 574. 
In addition to traveling in order to get a divorce, or resorting to annulments, 
other couples who wanted to dissolve their marriages simply resorted to 
deserting their partners. Id. at 575. In 1940, the percentage of white married 
women (excluding widows) who did not live with their husbands was 
approximately 30% greater in New York than the rest of the country. Id.    
84 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 576.   
85 Id.    
86 JACOB, supra note 81, at 37.  
87 Id. at 35–37.  
88 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 578.    
89 Again and again, the Committee was made aware of how ‘the formal 
law had spawned a set of practices inconsistent with any notions of 
sound public policy.’ Viewed in this way, divorce became something 
other than grist for the conservative-liberal debate. Because the issue 
was framed as ‘disjunction between law-on-the-books and law in 
action,’ divorce reform could be presented as a much-needed 
‘procedural’ change.  
Id. See also, BLAKE, supra note 36, at 212.  
90 Id. at 577.     
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agreement or a judicial separation decree.91 Although limited in 
reach, New York had passed its first no-fault divorce law.  
Further, when the New York Court of Appeals upheld the 
legality and retroactivity of conversion divorce in Gleason v. 
Gleason in 1970, it became clear that New York was moving in a 
positive direction insofar as its divorce laws were concerned.92 
Notably, the Court’s reasoning explicitly rejected any state interest 
in compelling couples to remain together in marriages that were 
clearly non-operational.93 The Court concluded that the purpose of 
the “no-fault provision” allowing for conversion divorce was to 
remove issues of misconduct from the Court’s consideration.94 
Arguably, the Gleason Court extended support to no-fault divorce 
based on “moral and social grounds.”95 No-fault divorce in New 
York was on its way.  
II. NEW YORK’S FAULT BASED DIVORCE SYSTEM  
New York’s fault-based divorce system was rife with issues 
that often led to bitter and divisive battles between couples wishing 
to end their marriages.96 Often, a couple’s reasons for divorcing 
did not neatly fall into one of the statute’s specific grounds for 
divorce. Additionally, judicially prescribed conditions for each 
ground of divorce often made the process more complex and 
                                                          
91 HALEM, supra note 37, at 258–59. Judicial separation decrees require a 
showing of marital fault. Id. Alternatively, parties may separate pursuant to a 
written agreement, filed with the Clerk of the Court, without a finding of fault. 
Id. In judicial separations, either the innocent party or the party against whom a 
judgment has been made may apply for conversion. Id.  
92 See Gleason v. Gleason, 256 N.E.2d 513, 516 (N.Y. 1970) (holding that 
the action for a conversion divorce could be maintained even by the person who 
was found at fault in the original separation action). “Conversion divorce” 
occurs when two parties separate pursuant to a separation agreement or decree 
by the court. The terms of the agreement or decree must be abided by and the 
parties must live separately for a designated period of time—at which time the 
separation may be “converted” into a divorce by the Supreme Court. See id.    
93 See id.  
94 Id.  
95 HALEM, supra note 37, at 266.   
96 See Miller, supra note 3, at 551.  
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resulted in uncertain outcomes. Further, while the financial 
stability of the divorcing parties was often a motivating factor 
behind courts’ refusals to grant divorce petitions, such 
considerations frequently resulted in inequitable decisions. 
Ultimately, New York’s defunct divorce finance laws were a major 
catalyst for the current overhaul of the state’s domestic relations 
laws.  
A. Marital Fault  
The fault-based divorce system subsisted in New York until the 
amendment of subsection seven to Domestic Relations Law section 
170 in October of 2010. Under the prior New York Domestic 
Relations Law section 170, an action for divorce could only be 
granted if the couple could establish one of the six grounds for 
divorce established in 1966.97 While only 23 percent of divorces in 
2009 were contested in New York, there was still a possibility of a 
contested divorce and the ensuing fault trial, with long, drawn out 
witness testimonies on the alleged wrongdoing of the parties and 
painful attacks on each party’s credibility.98  
The following cases illustrate the difficulty of requiring fault in 
order to divorce and demonstrate how courts often refused to grant 
divorces. While it appeared that New York courts strictly enforced 
fault criteria, the underlying financial concerns at play in divorce 
proceedings were often the central consideration in courts’ 
                                                          
97 Cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment (also constructive 
abandonment), imprisonment of one of the parties for a period of three or more 
years, adultery, and living separate and apart pursuant to a separation judgment 
or agreement. N.Y. DOM. REL. § 170 (McKinney 2010).  According to the New 
York State Department of Health, the most frequently cited grounds for divorce 
in 2008 (the most recent year for which statistics are available) were 
abandonment and cruel and inhuman treatment, respectively. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, 
INFO. FOR A HEALTHY N.Y.: TABLE 50: DIVORCES BY COUNTY OF DECREE AND 
LEGAL GROUNDS FOR NEW YORK STATE - 2008, available at http://www. 
health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/vital_statistics/2008/table50.htm. Out of 52,619 
divorces filed for in 2008, abandonment accounted for over 36,000 of the 
grounds with cruelty a distant second at just over 10,000. Id.  
98 Kolker & Hurtado, supra note 6. 
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reasoning.99 In Hessen v. Hessen—the first case to highlight the 
various considerations evaluated by courts when determining 
whether conduct constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment sufficient 
to grant a divorce—the court held that physical or mental abuse 
warrants a divorce only if the conduct makes cohabitation improper 
or unsafe.100 In Hessen, the Court of Appeals noted that the “cruel 
and inhuman treatment” ground for divorce could not be satisfied 
by the mere breakdown of the marital relationship, but would 
require evidentiary proof of cruelty.101 What is particularly 
noteworthy in Hessen is the Court’s focus on the respective ages of 
the husband and wife seeking divorce, and on the duration of the 
marriage.102 The Court denied the Hessens a divorce,103 stating that 
the appearance of misconduct, “which in a matured marriage might 
fail to justify a finding of substantial misconduct, may justify or 
even compel an inference of substantial misconduct in a newer 
marriage.”104 The case law that follows Hessen further 
demonstrates the absurdity of New York’s divorce laws. 
The strict evidentiary standard required to end a marriage of 
long duration is illustrated by Palin v. Palin.105 Although the wife 
in Palin proved that she had been verbally abused, threatened, and 
physically attacked by her husband, the court held that this abuse 
was insufficient for a finding of cruel and inhuman treatment.106 
The court noted that the treatment did not suggest anything more 
than “unpleasantness.”107 In fact, New York courts have held that 
                                                          
99 See, e.g., Hessen v. Hessen, 308 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1974).  
100 Id. (emphasis added).  
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 895 (stating that for marriages of long duration it is proper to 
apply the admonition “for better or worse”).  
103 Id.   
104 Id. at 893–95. The Court took into account that an older couple may 
experience the “deleterious effects of old age on the physical and mental 
disposition,” which may create problems within a marriage, and that changes in 
family situations like the departures of grown children from the household or 
family tragedy, may create difficulties. Id. 
105 Palin v. Palin, 624 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).  
106 Id.   
107 Id. (granting the wife a divorce based on adultery but rejecting the 
divorce on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment).  
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isolated acts of violence are not sufficient for a divorce based on 
cruel and inhuman treatment.108  
In a well-publicized case that occurred in 2010,109 a Nassau 
County court denied a husband’s divorce request on the grounds of 
cruel and inhuman treatment despite the fact that his wife had 
threatened him with a samurai sword.110 Evidence during the 
lengthy fault trial showed that the wife had abused the husband for 
years.111 The constant abuse resulted in the husband’s sleep 
deprivation because he feared “sneak attacks” from his wife.112 
The wife once brought the sharp tip of a samurai sword “within 
inches” of her husband’s face; this extreme event precipitated the 
husband’s request for a divorce.113 However, noting that the 
marriage was one of long duration, the court denied the husband a 
divorce.114 The court’s opinion also noted that the husband failed 
to testify that the alleged incidents “so endangered his physical or 
mental well-being as to render it unsafe or improper for him to 
cohabit with his wife.”115  
                                                          
108 See, e.g., Wenderlich v. Wenderlich, 311 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1970) (finding “proof . . . that defendant struck the plaintiff the morning of 
September 1, 1967 . . . insufficient to establish the cause of action”); Concetto v. 
Concetto, 377 N.Y.S.2d 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (holding that “[t]he proof, 
however, failed to establish that the name-calling and the two isolated acts of 
alleged violence, to which the husband testified, so endangered his physical or 
mental well-being as to render it unsafe or improper for him to cohabit with his 
wife”); Rabinowitz v. Rabinowitz, 321 N.Y.S.2d 934 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971) 
(explaining that “[e]vidence showing that marriage was marked by lack of 
harmony, frequent quarrels and occasional strife, all adding up to degree of 
incompatibility, still fell far short of statutory requirements”). 
109 Vesselin Mitev, Sword Attack Claim Does Not Cut It; ‘Abandonment’ 
Wins Divorce, LAW.COM (April 8, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article. 
jsp?id=1202447747480&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.   
110 S.K. v. I.K., No. 203247-2008, 2010 WL 1371943, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Mar. 29, 2010).   
111 Id. at *5–6.     
112 Id. at *3.    
113 Id. at *5. During the lengthy “fault” trial, the couple’s daughter testified 
that the tip of the sword was “extremely sharp” and, had she not intervened, her 
mother could have seriously injured or killed her father. Id.  
114 Id. at *9.    
115 Id. (citing Hessen v. Hessen, 308 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1974)).   
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These cases illustrate the difficulty of proving cruel and 
inhuman treatment as grounds for a divorce in New York. 
Although the average divorce case lacks the drama of a samurai 
sword, many spouses suffered physical or emotional abuse that did 
not rise to the court-defined level of cruel and inhuman treatment 
under New York law.116 Asserting other grounds for divorce was 
often just as complicated and ineffective.  
New York courts made equally outrageous holdings under the 
awning of constructive abandonment grounds for divorce. In order 
for a spouse to assert constructive abandonment,117 the refusal to 
engage in marital relations must have persisted for at least one year 
prior to the commencement of the action.118 However, in Hammer 
v. Hammer, the Court asserted that the failure to file for a divorce 
on the grounds of constructive abandonment after an extended 
period of time could bar a spouse from claiming constructive 
                                                          
116 See, e.g., Gross v. Gross, 836 N.Y.S.2d 166, 168–69 (N.Y. App. Ct. 
2007) (holding that reprehensible and highly offensive behavior does not 
necessarily establish cruel and inhuman treatment ground for divorce where wife 
testified that her husband had forced himself on her sexually, trapped her inside 
the marital bedroom on occasion, and threw her against the walls of their home); 
E.D. v. M.D., 801 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (holding that the 
evidence of physical contact between the parties was isolated and minimal and 
not grounds for cruel and inhuman treatment where husband was frequently 
argumentative and struck the wife on occasion but where the wife had not 
sought medical treatment for any injuries); S.C. v. A.C., 798 N.Y.S.2d 348, 352 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that, with regard to the incidents of physical 
contact between the parties, none were more than minor and incidental to the 
behavior complained of and were insufficient for grounds of cruel and inhuman 
treatment).  
117 Constructive abandonment is one of the most popular grounds for 
divorce. See DEP’T. OF HEALTH, supra note 97 (listing the number of divorces in 
New York in 2008). A refusal or failure to engage in marital relations, to rise to 
the level of constructive abandonment, must be unjustified, willful, and 
continued, despite repeated requests from the other spouse for resumption of 
cohabitation. See Silver v. Silver, 677 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1998).  
118 See, e.g., Levy v. Levy, 385 N.Y.S.2d 314 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) 
(finding the husband’s charge of constructive abandonment insufficient based on 
timeliness); DeAngelis v. DeAngelis, 388 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) 
(rejecting claim “[w]here wife’s refusal to have sexual relations with husband 
existed for much less than one year prior to institution of divorce action”).  
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abandonment altogether.119 The Hammer Court held that where a 
husband had not threatened to terminate his sexless marriage, but 
allowed it to continue for ten years, he impliedly consented to the 
status of the relationship and could not claim constructive 
abandonment as grounds for divorce.120  
Although Hammer involved a case where the couple had not 
engaged in intimate relations for ten years, New York courts have 
rejected constructive abandonment claims involving much shorter 
periods.121 In Breckinridge, the couple mutually declared that their 
marriage had been sexless for three years,122 and each asserted that 
the lack of marital relations was due to the other’s lack of 
interest.123 The court held that because both parties implicitly 
agreed to eliminate marital intimacy, neither could be at fault and 
no divorce could be granted.124  
By ignoring any multitude of reasonable causes for a couple to 
remain together despite their lack of marital relations, New York 
courts arguably encouraged couples to surrender their marriages 
early. Couples with legitimate reasons for staying together such as 
raising children or financial inability to separate could lose the 
ability to divorce on the grounds of constructive abandonment at a 
later date. These cases are merely a small sample of New York 
divorce cases. The inconsistent, unpredictable nature of the 
decisions clearly illustrates the necessity of a unilateral and 
“faultless” ground for divorce.  
B. Alimony 
The effect that New York’s alimony laws had on individuals in 
                                                          
119 Hammer v. Hammer, 342 N.Y.S.2d 9, 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973), aff’d, 
34 N.Y.2d 545 (1974).  
120 Id; see Bunce v. Bunce, 426 N.Y.S.2d 105 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) 
(constructive abandonment claim based on refusal to engage in marital relations 
for fifteen years).  
121 See, e.g., Breckinridge v. Breckinridge, 478 N.Y.S.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1984).  
122 Id. at 137. 
123 Id.    
124 Id. at 138.  
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the wake of divorce—particularly women—was a significant 
factor behind the Court of Appeals’ holding in Hessen and other 
cases like it.125 The old Domestic Relations Law deprived alimony 
and occupancy of the marital home to a spouse against whom a 
divorce had been granted.126 With this in mind, New York courts 
decided that special thought should be given to the deprivation of 
support rights that would follow a fault determination against 
dependent spouses.127 For example, because the husband in Hessen 
was the one who filed for divorce and the one who asserted cruelty 
against his wife, the Court felt that it would be inappropriate to 
deprive her—a dependent older woman—of support by granting 
the husband a divorce absent truly grievous misconduct.128 The 
consideration for the financial welfare of spouses post-divorce 
sheds a more reasonable light on the Court’s holding. In fact, the 
concern for the financial effect of divorce on spouses was common 
for most of the grounds for divorce in New York, as the judiciary 
did not want individuals to become wards of the state.129  
Over time, it became clear that dependent wives seeking 
divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment were held 
to a lower standard of proof because of the inapplicability of the 
alimony preclusion.130Although this inequity made sense given the 
                                                          
125 Hessen v. Hessen, 308 N.E.2d 891, 895 (N.Y. 1974). At the time Hessen 
was decided, alimony was only awarded to wives. Brooke Grossman, Note, The 
Evolution of Equitable Distribution in New York, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
607, 611 (2007).  
126 Hessen, 308 N.E. 2d at 410.  
127 Such as the wife in Hessen. Id. at 412 (noting that because of the effect 
that fault finding has on the opportunity to obtain support and other post-divorce 
relief, courts should use broad discretion in considering the grant of a divorce 
based on cruel and inhuman treatment).    
128 Id. (holding that the economic consequences of granting of the divorce 
must be treated as an influential factor in determining whether to grant divorce). 
129 See Lord v. Lord, 409 N.Y.S.2d 46, 49 (N.Y. 1978) (noting that the 
division of assets and alimony would be considered differently if the wife and 
children were in danger of becoming wards of the state).  
130 See, e.g., Filippi v. Filippi, 384 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1011 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1976) (taking note of the fact that most courts applied a lesser standard of proof 
for women seeking divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment, but 
that in the case at bar, the court would strictly apply the Hessen standard where 
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financial issues dependent women faced in the event that their 
financially secure husbands should decide to divorce them, the 
extreme domestic situations some husbands were incapable of 
escaping highlighted the need for reform of New York’s divorce 
finance laws.131  
C. Equitable Distribution 
One of the primary reasons for arbitrary and inconsistent 
divorce holdings was New York’s failure to update divorce finance 
law when the state updated its divorce law in 1966.132 At the time, 
New York retained the traditional common law view that legal title 
to property was determinative of its ownership upon divorce.133 
Under such a system, the husband, who was typically the 
homeowner and breadwinner, left the marriage with a majority of 
the property.134 This inequality in post-divorce assets was typically 
remedied by awarding the wife permanent or long-term alimony.135 
                                                          
the marriage was long in duration). 
131 In Johnson v. Johnson, the court rejected a husband’s petition for 
divorce on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment despite the fact that his wife 
had been absent from the family home for extended periods and had assaulted 
him on at least two occasions. Johnson v. Johnson, 478 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1984) (holding that the wife’s actions did not affect the husband in any 
deleterious way). In Denny v. Denny, the court of appeals denied the plaintiff 
husband his application for divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman 
treatment despite his wife’s refusal to move with him to another city when 
transferred by his employer, that he felt dominated by her to the point that his 
self-confidence was shaken, and that she deprived him of reasonable intimacy. 
Denny v. Denny, 409 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978). In its consideration 
of the husband’s request for a divorce, the court of appeals took note of the fact 
that the wife would be unable to obtain alimony if it granted her husband a 
divorce. Id.  
132 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 588.  
133 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 7 (3d ed. 
2005).  
134 See Bea A. Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed 
Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689, 697 n.47 (1990) (citing JACOB, supra note 
81, at 5).  
135 JACOB, supra note 81, at 5. In contrast to “title” states, such as New 
York, a smaller number of states adhere to the “community property” method 
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Thus, in divorce proceedings where fault was asserted against the 
wife, courts were wary of granting the husband a divorce for fear 
of leaving the wife with no property or earning potential and 
without the relief of alimony.136  
New York struggled with the effects of its divorce finance laws 
throughout the 1970s, while nearly all other states adopted 
equitable distribution laws.137 Equitable distribution deemed 
marriage an economic partnership138 and aimed to “credit the 
unpaid work that the typical non-employed homemaker put into 
the partnership.”139 However, women’s groups and state legislators 
in New York feared the excessive discretion granted to judges 
under the equitable distribution system, and were concerned that 
distributing property equally would only encourage divorce.140 
Proponents of the equitable system eventually prevailed, and New 
York adopted an equitable distribution system in 1980.141  
Further, New York’s Domestic Relations Law section 236 was 
                                                          
where all income earned by either spouse or property purchased with those 
earnings is collectively termed “marital property. DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 
20, at 585. Eight states—Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, 
Nevada, Texas, and Washington—follow this “community property” principle. 
See Jens-Uwe Franck, ‘So Hedge Therefore, Who Join Forever:’ Understanding 
the Interrelation of No-Fault Divorce and Premarital Contracts, 23 INT’L J. L., 
POL. & FAM. 235, 243 (2009). Under this system, no matter how title is held, 
each spouse owns half of the marital property. TURNER, supra note 133, at 6–7.  
136 See, e.g., Hessen v. Hessen, 33 N.Y.2d 406, 410 (N.Y. 1975) (taking 
note of the fact that, under section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law, “a 
divorce granted on the basis of the wife’s ‘misconduct’ will deprive the wife of 
both her rights to alimony and the exclusive occupation of the marital 
residence”).   
137 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 587. 
138 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 160, 9A U.L.A. XX (1970). Using 
definitions typical of community property systems, the Uniform Marriage & 
Divorce Act became a prototype for widely adopted equitable distribution 
statutes, in which courts are directed to make a just division of marital property 
based on a series of factors.  
139 NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE 
NATION 206 (2000).  
140 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 587. 
141 1980 N.Y. Laws 434 (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 
236 (McKinney 2010)).  
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amended following the 1979 Supreme Court case Orr v. Orr.142 
The Supreme Court fundamentally altered New York’s divorce 
finance law by determining that gender based divorce statutes, 
such as the one that governed alimony awards, were 
unconstitutional due to their disparate treatment of male and 
female parties.143 The Court held that spousal support might be 
awarded to either deserving spouse regardless of gender.144 The 
ruling was ultimately incorporated into the Equitable Distribution 
Law, and courts now award maintenance to the less monied party 
in order to maintain that spouse’s standard of living in the 
aftermath of divorce.  
D. Maintenance 
Property division was tied to alimony, and New York’s change 
to equitable distribution altered the law of alimony in a 
fundamental way.145 As in the Equitable Distribution Law, the 
legislature replaced alimony with “maintenance” payments.146 
While the practice of alimony was rooted in the concept that the 
husband was the primary source of financial support, and was thus 
his wife’s caretaker, maintenance is based on the idea that 
marriage is an economic partnership. Thus, under the alimony 
system a husband was charged with financially supporting his ex-
wife because she lacked the means to do so herself.147 Conversely, 
maintenance payments represented compensation for loss of 
                                                          
142 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that an Alabama statute 
authorizing the imposition of alimony obligations on husbands in favor of wives, 
but not in favor of husbands, was unconstitutional).   
143 Id. at 283. The percentage of male alimony recipients rose to 3.6% in 
the five-year period ending in 2006. Anita Raghavan, Men Receiving Alimony 
Want a Little Respect, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB120700651883978623.html.   
144 Orr, 440 U.S. at 280–82.   
145 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 588.   
146 Id.    
147 Which is the reason that alimony payments ceased once the ex-wife 
remarried, since she would then be “taken care of” by her new husband.  
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earning from the marital partnership.148 Maintenance payments 
were calculated in order to preserve the parties’ standard of living 
during the marriage and to provide for the non-monied spouse’s 
“reasonable needs.”149 Courts were encouraged to limit the 
duration of maintenance payments as a result of the legislation, 
pushing for recipients to become self-sufficient as quickly as 
possible.150 Effectively, New York ended permanent spousal 
support.151   
 Despite the equitable change intended by the legislation, the 
Equitable Distribution Law and subsequent shift away from 
permanent alimony did not have the effect of alleviating post-
divorce economic inequality,152 since most divorcing couples have 
few assets to divide.153 In most divorces, the equitable distribution 
of assets does not offer each spouse enough of a solid economic 
foundation in the aftermath of divorce.154  
It is much more costly to maintain two households than a 
single marital home. However, the standard of living for men 
generally increases in the aftermath of divorce while for women, it 
significantly decreases.155 This is because a high earning spouse—
traditionally the husband—can recoup his or her old lifestyle over 
time whereas a low-earning or non-working spouse cannot do so as 
                                                          
148 Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New 
York’s Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 
621, 640 (1991).  
149 1980 N.Y. LAWS 434 (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 
236 (B)(6) (McKinney 2009)). Maintenance ceased, under this system, when the 
wife remarried. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 236 (B)(6)(c) (West 2010). However, 
maintenance could continue even if the wife was in a relationship with another 
man, but not technically married. Id. at § 6(d).   
150 Garrison, supra note 148, at 640.  
151 In 1986, however, the New York legislature amended the Equitable 
Distribution Law to permit indefinite maintenance payments in situations that 
involved older and disabled women with no job skills other than homemaking 
and child rearing.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6) (McKinney 1986) 
(amended 2010); See also, N.Y. JUR. DOM. REL. § 2206 (McKinney 2010).  
152 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20 at 589, 598–99. 
153 Garrison, supra note 148, at 662–64. 
154 Id. at 658. 
155 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 595–96.    
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easily or quickly, if at all. Thus, the post-divorce economic needs 
of most non-working or low-earning spouses simply cannot be 
achieved by equitable distribution of the marital assets.156 The 
income of high earning spouses is inevitably a much more valuable 
“asset” than marital property.157 It follows that the non-earning 
spouse, who, with the passage of the Equitable Distribution Law, 
traded an award of temporary maintenance for permanent alimony, 
underwent a substantial economic deterioration in the wake of 
divorce.158  
III. THE NEW LAW: CRITICISM, PRAISE, AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
The adoption of a no-fault divorce option has engendered both 
excitement and outrage among the various parties involved in this 
debate. Women’s groups in particular, who blame no-fault divorce 
systems for the decreased occurrence of domestic violence, are 
praising the ability of spouses to unilaterally divorce one another 
as a major step forward. However, opponents point to the United 
States’ high divorce rate—connecting no-fault divorce to the ease 
with which couples can dissolve their marriages. Further, 
confusion over the new law’s maintenance provisions has scholars 
and practitioners concerned, and will undoubtedly be the cause of 
future debate.  
A. Unilateral Divorce 
The key component to New York’s divorce law reform is the 
addition of Domestic Relations Law Section 170(7), which allows 
parties to divorce if the marital relationship has irretrievably 
broken down for at least six months, and one party has so stated 
under oath.159 This judgment can be granted only after the issues of 
equitable distribution, spousal maintenance, child support, counsel 
                                                          
156 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 597.  
157 Garrison, supra note 148, at 664.  
158 See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 20, at 597.   
159 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (McKinney 2010).  
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and expert fees, child custody and visitation are resolved.160  
One of the chief advantages of section 170(7) is the ability of 
one spouse to dissolve the marriage without the consent of the 
other.161 This provision has received a great deal of criticism. 
Women’s groups such as the National Organization of Women fear 
that this “divorce on demand” will lead to increased divorce rates 
and will negatively impact the financial security of women who 
will be left destitute once their husbands unilaterally divorce 
them.162 Other opponents of the law cite children as the “voiceless 
third parties in divorce,” and argue that making divorce “easy” 
gives couples the opportunity to split up despite the fact that 
repairing their marriage for the sake of their children may be 
possible.163 Others argue that, because women seek divorce more 
frequently than men,164 no-fault divorce disproportionately harms 
                                                          
160 Id. These issues may be resolved by either the parties or determined by 
the Court. Id.   
161 See id.  
162 See Marcia Pappas, Reject Divorce on Demand, Comment to Is New 
York Ready for No-Fault Divorce?, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Jun. 15, 2010), 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/is-new-york-ready-for-no-
fault-divorce/#marcia. See also Andrew J. Cherlin, Not Your Mother’s Divorce, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2010.  
163 Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Voiceless Third Parties, N.Y. TIMES 
BLOG (Jun. 15, 2010), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/is-
new-york-ready-for-no-fault-divorce#barbara.  
On this score, a consensus among social scientists has emerged. It 
distinguishes between children in families where parents are engaged in 
unremittingly high levels of conflict and children in families where 
parents are unhappy but have low conflict. In high conflict families, 
children are better off if their parents divorce. In low-conflict families, 
however, children are better off if their parents stay together and repair 
the marriage. Sadly . . . the majority of parental divorces today occur in 
low-conflict situations.  
Id. 
164 Research shows that the spouse who “wants out” of the marriage most is 
“more often the wife.” Betsey Stevenson, Divorce Reform Hits New York, 
FREAKONOMICS (Jun. 16, 2010), http://wwwfreakonomics.com/2010/06/16/ 
divorce-form-hits-new-york/. Women in the United States currently file slightly 
more than two-thirds of divorces. Vicki Larson, Why Women Walk Out More 
Than Men, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2011, 2:58 AM), http://www. 
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men since men are unlikely to secure custody of children in the 
aftermath of divorce and are often ordered to make child support 
payments.165  
Conversely, family law scholars and practitioners point out that 
one of the most surprising aspects of the no-fault divorce system is 
that it seems to have little, if any, effect on divorce rates.166 At the 
time most states across the country began adopting no-fault 
divorce systems, the divorce rate doubled.167 However, this 
increase in divorce rates occurred “in equal measure in those states 
adopting unilateral divorce” as in states where fault-based divorce 
systems remained in place.168 Additionally, proponents of the new 
law point out that the state with the lowest divorce rate in the 
country, Massachusetts, has permitted no-fault divorce since 
1975.169 Although divorce rates may increase in the aftermath of 
                                                          
huffingtonpost.com/Vicki-larson/why-women-want-out-more-t_b_792133.html 
(discussing a study done by the National Marriage Project of the University of 
Virginia, which found that two-thirds of all divorces are initiated by women); 
See also Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child 
Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 792 (2006). 
165 See generally JEFFERY M. LEVING WITH KENNETH A. DACHMAN, 
FATHERS’ RIGHTS: HARD-HITTING & FAIR ADVICE FOR EVERY FATHER 
INVOLVED IN CUSTODY DISPUTE 1–3 (1997). See also Judith Seltzer, 
Consequences of Marital Disruption for Children, 20 ANN. REV. SOC. 235, 240–
41 (1994) (noting that mothers often obtain custody of children after divorce). 
Rights of a Non-Custodial Parent Paying Child Support, LIVESTRONG.COM 
(June 3, 2010), http://www.livestrong.com/article/138803-rights-non-custodial-
parent-paying-child-support/ (“Most payers of child support are men. . . .”).  
166 See, e.g., Betsey Stevenson, Divorce and Domestic Violence, N.Y. 
TIMES BLOG (Jun. 15, 2010), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/ 
06/15/is-new-york-ready-for-no-fault-divorce#betsey.  
167 Id.   
168 Id.   
169 Cherlin, supra note 162. “[Massachusetts’] divorce rate is low for at 
least two . . .  reasons: [f]irst, its population is highly-educated, and educated 
people avoid marrying young, which is a risk factor for divorce. Second, it has a 
large Catholic population, and Catholics are still somewhat less likely to 
divorce.” Cherlin notes that New York has an equally educated populous with a 
great deal of Catholics. Id. Therefore, he expects the rate of divorce in New 
York (which is currently tied for the fifth lowest rate of divorce in the country) 
to remain low despite no-fault divorce. Id.   
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New York’s adoption of no-fault divorce, studies of other states 
show that this increase will likely be temporary.170  
Further, advocates of no-fault divorce herald it as one of the 
best means of combating domestic abuse.171 Reports of domestic 
violence tend to decrease in states that adopt no-fault divorce.172 
Studies show that the decrease in domestic violence is not simply 
due to the fact that spouses being abused can unilaterally leave 
their abusive partners, but because “abusive spouses understand 
that they will be left.”173 Additional praise of no-fault divorce 
systems attribute decreased rates of female suicide to the ability of 
abused or unhappy women to unilaterally leave their partners.174 
Therefore, it appears that no-fault divorce systems tend to provide 
an important benefit to particularly defenseless members of 
society.  
B. Maintenance 
The enactment of Domestic Relations Law section 170(7) is 
only a small portion of the New York divorce reform package.175 
The accompanying bills that amend Domestic Relations Law 
sections 236, 237, and 238 contain provisions to protect the less 
monied spouse.176 The new laws require the court to provide for 
temporary support during a divorce proceeding when the parties 
have unequal financial resources.177 The revision of pendente lite 
                                                          
170 Id. New Yorkers waiting to file for divorce, who did not have grounds 
to do so, will file immediately, which will likely result in a short swell in 
divorce rates. Id. 
171 See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 166.  
172 Studies show a marked decrease in domestic violence among states that 
adopted no-fault divorce systems relative to states (such as New York) that did 
not. Id.   
173 The studies show a thirty-percent decline in domestic violence, which 
indicates that violence in lasting marriages decreased. Id.    
174 Id.  
175 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236–38 (McKinney 2010).  
176 Id.   
177 Id.   
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awards,178 which order the monied spouse179 to pay interim counsel 
fees for the non-monied spouse during the course of the case so as 
to enable her or him to carry on or defend it, were designed to 
better reflect the circumstances couples face during divorce 
proceedings.180 The new laws create a presumption that the less 
monied spouse will be entitled to the payment of these fees, which 
will be set by a new formula.181 Further, the new law revises the 
way that temporary maintenance awards are calculated by granting 
justices a mathematical formula to determine presumptive 
awards.182 Lastly, the method for determining post-divorce 
maintenance awards received an overhaul with the addition of 
extra factors that the court may consider when deviating from the 
presumptive award.183  
The new statutory guidelines established for determining 
temporary maintenance are intended to provide greater consistency 
and fairness.184 However, the mathematical formula for awarding 
presumptive temporary maintenance, and the factors to be 
considered by courts when deviating from this presumptive award, 
may be a cause of some confusion for justices. The temporary 
maintenance formula for presumptive awards requires Supreme 
Court justices to take two sets of calculations into account.185 The 
new mathematical formula for determining temporary maintenance 
is meant to provide uniformity and predictability. However, the 
                                                          
178 Pendente lite awards are the interim support payments provided to the 
lower income spouse while divorce litigation is pending. 65 AM. JUR. 2D 
Receivers § 3 (West 2010). 
179 The spouse with larger financial net worth.  
180 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5) (McKinney 2010).  
181 Id.   
182 Id.  
183 Id.  
184 Stashenko, supra note 15.  
185 First, the formula requires subtracting twenty-percent of the lower 
earning spouse’s income from 30% of the higher spouse’s income. (M=0.30(H)–
0.20(L)). N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B) (McKinney 2010). The second formula 
calls for the court to subtract the lower earning spouse’s income from 40% of 
the combined income of both spouses. (M=0.40(H+L)–L). Id. The Court will use 
the lower of the two figures to set the guideline amount of temporary 
maintenance. Id. at 5-a(c)(1).  
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determination of temporary maintenance awards is ultimately at 
the discretion of the courts, as justices are free to deviate from the 
presumptive award if he or she “finds that the presumptive award 
is unjust or inappropriate.”186 Thus, a method that was intended to 
take the uncertainty and confusion out of determinations of 
temporary maintenance, by providing parties with a mathematical 
formula, is not much changed from that of the old method of 
calculating temporary maintenance. Additionally, the statute’s 
vague guidance for justices on how to determine whether a 
presumptive award is “unjust or inappropriate” will undoubtedly 
confound justices.187 What is worse, however, is that the lack of 
guidance will ultimately create windfalls for some lucky parties 
while others will be required to make do with the scant terms of 
the presumptive award.  
Additionally, the presumptive temporary maintenance formula 
only applies to the first $500,000 of income.188 Any income above 
this point may not be calculated into the abovementioned 
mathematical formula but must be considered separately by the 
court in determining temporary maintenance.189 This will 
inevitably be an added source of confusion and possible tension for 
divorcing New Yorkers. Because New York is one of the 
wealthiest states in the country, with six of its sixty-two counties 
among the wealthiest per capita in the nation,190 it is likely that 
many justices will have to determine additional guideline amounts 
of temporary maintenance through the consideration of a variety of 
imprecise factors presented by the statute.191 Thus, the new divorce 
finance laws largely leave wealthy parties to litigate the details of 
                                                          
186 Id. at 5-a(e).  
187 Stashenko, supra note 15. 
188 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)5-a(b)(5) (McKinney 2010).    
189 Id.  
190 Francesca Levy, America’s 25 Richest Counties, FORBES.COM (Mar. 4, 
2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/04/america-richest-counties-lifestylereal 
-estate-wealthy-suburbs_2.html. 
191 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 Part B, 5-a(c)(2)(i)-(xix) (McKinney 2010). 
These factors include the marriage’s length, the substantial differences in the 
parties’ incomes, and the parties’ standard of living established during the 
marriage. Id. 
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their pre- and post-divorce maintenance, and this will likely affect 
many New York couples.  
Another foreseeable concern with the law’s new divorce 
finance provisions lies in the determination of post-divorce 
maintenance awards. In calculating maintenance, justices are 
charged to consider an array of factors such as the length of the 
couple’s marriage, the standard of living of the parties, the earning 
capacity of the parties and their prospects of employment, and 
other factors.192 These factors are often subjective and can be 
difficult to measure, which may allow justices to vary dramatically 
in their maintenance awards. An “outspoken supporter”193 of New 
York’s implementation of no-fault divorce, former Appellate 
Division Justice Sondra M. Miller, noted that “if [I] were still 
hearing divorce cases, [I] would be confused by how to set 
maintenance.”194 While the new law set up a Law Revision 
Commission to study the effect of the new maintenance provisions 
on the setting of maintenance levels around the state, in the 
interim, there may be significant differences in maintenance 
awards that will unduly disadvantage some spouses throughout the 
state.195  
 The new maintenance formulas are the new law’s most 
striking weakness and will likely be the source of much confusion. 
The reform of New York’s divorce laws was intended to make 
divorce more equitable and less time consuming and costly. 
However, the new temporary and post-divorce maintenance 
provisions offer confusing and potentially time consuming 
solutions to an already uncertain and drawn out process.  
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The enactment of a no-fault option for the dissolution of 
marriage in New York is a positive development in the domestic 
                                                          
192 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 Part B, 5-a(e)(1)(a)-(q) (McKinney 2010).  
193 Stashenko, supra note 15. 
194 Id. Miller noted: “If I were a judge, does it mean that I consider child 
support? The law is not clear. It is a very troublesome piece of legislation . . . .” 
Id.    
195 Id.   
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relations laws of the state. However, while fault based divorce laws 
have their evils, they also encourage (or at times force) spouses to 
negotiate with one another in order to secure adequate post-divorce 
settlements. The default rules provided by no-fault divorce systems 
ignore the fact that each divorce is as unique as the circumstances 
that brought the couple to desire an end to their marriage. Often 
times, one party is at “fault,” and if post-divorce settlements are to 
be properly calculated, all of the facts should be considered, 
including the blameworthy conduct of the parties. Further, in the 
likely event that New York courts continue to consider fault in the 
distribution of property and maintenance awards only in the most 
egregious cases, New Yorkers contemplating marriage should 
enter into premarital or post marital agreements so that they have 
the requisite control over their post-divorce lives.  
A. WHY A LITTLE FAULT IS A GOOD THING 
While “fault allegations and fault trials add significantly to the 
cost, delay and trauma of matrimonial litigation,” in many cases 
litigants use fault as a tactical advantage in securing a more 
equitable post marital settlement.196 This “tactical advantage” 
relates to the fact that many courts do not adequately provide post-
divorce financial protection for the non-monied spouse.197  For true 
post-divorce equitable distribution, New York’s divorce finance 
laws should take fault into account in situations where fault is 
relevant.  
The reasons for divorcing and the financial position of the 
parties are unique in each divorce. Often some form of fault does 
exist, and in order for courts to adequately address the dissolution 
of the marriage before them, they should be able to consider all of 
the events that led the parties to seek divorce. In keeping with the 
Court of Appeals’ holding in O’Brien, New York courts only allow 
fault to be a consideration in maintenance awards and property 
division in “egregious cases which shock the conscience of the 
                                                          
196 Miller, supra note 3, at 553; See also Kolker & Hurtado, supra note 6. 
197 Peter Nash Swisher, The ALI Principles: A Farewell to Fault-But What 
Remedy for the Egregious Marital Misconduct of an Abusive Spouse? 8 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y. 213, 214 (2001).  
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court.”198 In O’Brien, the husband sought consideration of the 
wife’s fault in respect to the equitable distribution of the couples’ 
martial property.199 However, the court held that there was no 
suggestion that the wife was guilty of fault sufficient to shock the 
conscience of the court, as was required for fault to be taken into 
account in the equitable distribution of property.200  
New York courts should reconsider the O’Brien standard and 
allow for the consideration of fault. Of course, this infusion of fault 
would have no bearing on the actual granting of divorce but would 
be considered solely for the purposes of maintenance and property 
distribution. According to the American Bar Association, marital 
fault is a “factor” in awarding maintenance and dividing property 
in twenty-five states and the District of Columbia.201 If no-fault 
divorce is to “do justice,”202 New Yorkers should have the same 
opportunity.203  
By removing the need for fault, New York’s Domestic 
Relations Law also takes away the strategic position that fault 
often plays in divorce settlements.  
The threat of a fault divorce trial has often been used as a 
negotiating tool between warring spouses . . . [W]hen a 
spouse didn’t want to divorce for religious or other reasons, 
the threat of a trial airing marital disputes or proving the 
allegations of fault, might be used as a negotiating tactic 
paving the way for better settlement terms . . . No-fault 
                                                          
198 See, e.g., O’Brien v. O’Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576 (N.Y. 1985). Although the 
O’Brien Court failed to define “egregious misconduct,” lower courts have 
concluded that in order for conduct to affect equitable distribution, non-
economic misconduct must “consist of behavior that falls well outside of the 
basis for an ordinary divorce action.” Thomas A. Elliot, Discovery and ‘Non-
Egregious’ Marital Fault, 12 NO. 1 N.Y. FAM. L. MONTHLY 3, 4 (Sept. 2010).   
199 O’Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 576. 
200 Id.  
201 A.B.A., ALIMONY/SPOUSAL SUPPORT FACTORS, available at http:// 
www.abanet.org/family/familylaw/flqwinter07_alimony.pdf (last visited Mar. 
23, 2011).   
202 Wilson, supra note 27.  
203 Id.   
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divorce [] takes this card out of the mix.204  
The positive effects of no-fault divorce in New York should 
not preclude courts from considering the harmful symptoms of real 
marital fault when structuring the couple’s post-divorce property 
settlement or maintenance allocation.205  
Many courts in jurisdictions where the legislature enacted no-
fault divorce laws have held that fault may be considered.206 As is 
evidenced by the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions, the fault 
of one or both parties may properly be considered in respect to 
alimony, spousal support, or property division pursuant to a 
divorce based on no-fault grounds. Because New York’s current 
policy of not considering fault during maintenance determinations 
is similarly non-statutory, its courts should note the reasoning 
behind the decisions of other jurisdictions and make a common-
law based change by allowing the consideration of fault in 
appropriate circumstances.  
Other no-fault states have considered fault in maintenance 
determinations. In Huggins v. Huggins, the court rejected the 
husband’s assertion that Alabama’s no-fault divorce statute 
precluded the consideration of fault in the court’s grant of 
alimony.207 The court wisely indicated that marital misconduct was 
a natural aspect of deciding alimony payments if there was fault to 
be taken into consideration.208 The court held that a trial court 
might consider fault when making a property division, even if it 
                                                          
204 Kolker & Hurtado, supra note 6. 
205 Evans, supra note 34, at 475.  
206 See, e.g., Edwards v. Edwards, 26 So.2d 1254, 1260 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2009); Cooper v. Cooper, 382 So.2d 569, 571 (Ala. Ct. App. 1980); Miller v. 
Miller, 361 So.2d 577, 579 (Ala. Ct. App. 1978); Huggins v. Huggins, 331 
So.2d 704, 707–08 (Ala.Ct. App. 1976); Sides v. Sides, So.2d 677, 679 (Ala. Ct. 
App. 1969). Occurring in jurisdictions where the no-fault provision did not 
include the role of fault in maintenance determinations or property division 
pursuant to a divorce based on no-fault grounds in the legislation itself.  
207 Huggins, 331 So.2d at 707–08.  
208 Id.; see Sides, So.2d at 679 (allowing fault to be considered); Miller, 361 
So.2d at 579 (the Court considered the fault of a husband in committing 
adultery); Cooper, 382 So.2d at 571 (the Court considered the fault of a spouse 
in committing adultery).  
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does not grant a fault-based divorce.209 The Edwards court went a 
step further adding that, “the facts and circumstances of each 
divorce case are different,” and thus trial courts should consider 
each of the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case 
at bar in dividing property.210 In Edwards, the wife had abused 
drugs and alcohol throughout the couple’s marriage and was thus 
entitled to less than equitable distribution in light of the fault she 
played in the marital dissolution.211  
A Connecticut court likewise considered a husband’s fault in 
connection with an award of maintenance and division of marital 
property in Sweet v. Sweet.212 The Sweet court noted that, although 
fault was not a consideration under the state’s divorce statute, the 
trial court could properly consider reasons for the dissolution of the 
marriage in making financial awards.213 This supports the 
aforementioned proposition that no two divorces are alike and that 
courts have a duty to review each case before them in its entirety.  
Further, in Givens v. Givens, the court noted that “[t]he trial 
court has discretion in the division of marital property, and a just 
division does not have to be equal, particularly where one party has 
engaged in misconduct.”214 The court went on to explain that the 
conduct of parties during the marriage is a factor to be considered 
when allocating marital property.215 However, it is important to 
note the Givens court’s caution: although marital fault should be 
taken into account in dividing marital property, “it should not serve 
as a basis for ordering excessive maintenance against, or 
inadequate marital property to, the offending spouse.”216 The 
                                                          
209 Edwards, 26 So.3d at 1260. 
210 Id. at 1259. 
211 Id. at 1260.  
212 Sweet v. Sweet, 462 A.2d 1031 (Conn. 1983).  
213 Id.   
214 Givens v. Givens, 599 S.W.2d 204, 205–06 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (trial 
court has discretion in division of martial property and a just division does not 
have to be equal, particularly where one party has engaged in misconduct).  
215 Id.   
216 Id.; see Hogan v. Hogan, 651 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (the 
conduct of the parties is among the factors to be considered in the division of 
marital property).   
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purpose of considering fault in the distribution of property should 
not be to punish the party at fault, but to allow for all relevant facts 
to be considered in establishing an equitable post-divorce 
settlement.  
In an apt holding by the Nevada Court of Appeals in Heim v. 
Heim, the Court noted that the concept of fault is consistent with 
the statutory requirement that property division and alimony 
awards be just and equitable, and have regard to the respective 
merits of the parties.217 Similarly, in Woodside v. Woodside, a 
South Carolina court noted that the marital conduct factor becomes 
important in equitable distribution when the conduct of one party 
to the marriage throws a burden on the other party that falls beyond 
the norms to be expected in a marital relationship.218 In such a 
situation, the court stated, marital misconduct should affect 
property distribution.219  
As Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson wrote, “Americans care 
why marriages break apart. Infidelity, violence [and] abandonment 
matter. This does not mean that we must uncritically embrace the 
old fault-based divorce laws . . . [but] [i]t does suggest [that] we 
need a prudent and realistic search for new approaches to enacting 
our shared moral understanding of marriage.”220 In response to its 
new no-fault divorce provision, New York courts should take heed 
of the manner in which other jurisdictions examine fault in the 
distribution of marital property and maintenance awards. Because 
fault includes more than “extremely outrageous behavior.”221 New 
                                                          
217 Heim v. Heim, 763 P.2d 678, 680 (Nev. 1988) (statutory requirement 
that awards be “just and equitable” applies to awards of alimony as well as to 
property disposition).   
218 Woodside v. Woodside, 350 S.E.2d 407, 412 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (in 
making an alimony award, court should consider the conduct of the parties).  
219 Id.  
220 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Don’t Let Divorce Off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES 
BLOG (Oct. 1, 2006), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/is-
new-york-ready-for-no-fault-divorce/#robin.; see also Lynn D. Wardle, Beyond 
Fault and No-Fault in the Reform of Marital Dissolution Law, in RECONCEIVING 
THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 16–17 (Robin Fretwell Wilson, ed., Cambridge 
University Press 2006).  
221 O’Brien v. O’Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 590 (N.Y. 1985).   
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York courts must reconsider the standard set forth in O’Brien and 
work toward a more equitable system of marital dissolution.  
B. The Argument for Premarital Agreements in No-Fault 
Divorce Jurisdictions 
Marriage, at its core, is a contract. Because individuals do not 
enter into contracts without negotiating the terms, entering into the 
most important contract of one’s life should not be treated any 
differently or with less care. Couples can choose to write this 
important marriage contract themselves via premarital agreements, 
or they can accept the default contracts written by the State 
Legislature.222 Accordingly, New Yorkers considering marriage in 
the increasingly streamlined divorce system that no-fault divorce 
encourages, should write the terms of their own marriage and 
divorce by entering into premarital or post marital contracts. 
Couples planning to marry have the option of entering into 
premarital agreements.223 Premarital agreements are recognized by 
all fifty states and are becoming more and more popular among 
couples contemplating marriage.224 Under early common law, 
prenuptial agreements were only applicable to the division of 
                                                          
222 Steven E. Landsburg, The Marriage Contract: Divorce is Just a 
Breakdown in Negotiations, SLATE.COM (Sept. 12, 1997), http://www.slate.com.  
223 Additionally, post-marital agreements are designed for couples that are 
already married and wish to negotiate the terms of a potential future divorce. 
ROBERT E. OLIPHANT & NANCY VER STEEGH, WORK OF THE FAMILY LAWYER 
445–47 (2d ed., Aspen Publishers 2008). 
224 Only approximately 5–10% of couples enter into premarital agreements 
in the United States. Beth Potier, For Many, Prenups Seem to Predict Doom, 
HARV. GAZETTE (2003), http://news.harvard.edu/gazzette/2003/10.16/01pre 
nup.html. The article interviews Heather Mahar, a fellow at the John M. Olin 
Center for Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School who surveyed 
students on Harvard’s campus on premarital agreements and divorce opinions. 
Mahar found that although respondents to her survey were able to correctly 
identify the national divorce rate (approximately 50%), the percent that thought 
they would eventually divorce was a mere 11.7%. Id. These inconsistencies 
underlie the reasoning for why the actual rate of couples that sign premarital 
agreements is only 5–10%. Id.    
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property upon one spouse’s death.225 However, due to the increase 
in divorce rates, courts were forced to expand their acceptance of 
premarital contracts to govern property distribution in the event of 
divorce.226  
The 1970 Florida Supreme Court case Posner v. Posner 
marked a shift in widespread judicial acceptance of premarital 
agreements.227 Although the Posner Court recognized an interest in 
keeping marriages together, it took note of the rising divorce rate 
and reasoned that  “prospective marriage partners . . . may want to 
consider and discuss . . . the disposition of their property and the 
alimony rights of [a spouse] in the event their marriage should 
fail.”228  
Premarital agreements are particularly beneficial in no-fault 
jurisdictions because of the divorce system’s ability to trap couples 
in disadvantageous financial situations during marriage. For 
example, a spouse who gives up or postpones his or her 
professional career to stay home with children or concentrate on 
caring for the marital home makes personal investments that have 
little value outside of the marriage.229 In no-fault divorce systems, 
where default rules are not totally equitable with regard to post 
marital maintenance or property division, dependent spouses are at 
the mercy of their financially secure partner.230 If that partner 
unilaterally decides to leave the marriage, these marital 
investments are devalued because they are economically worthless 
outside the home.231 Conversely, the partner who makes such 
                                                          
225 OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 223, at 445. 
226 Id.  
227 Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970) (holding that 
antenuptial agreements, settling alimony and property rights of the parties upon 
divorce, if conforming to stringent rules prescribed for ante- and post-nuptial 
agreements settling property rights of spouses and made in good faith and on 
proper grounds, cannot be said to facilitate or promote procurement of a divorce 
and are valid as to conditions existing at the time the agreement was made).   
228 Id.  
229 Franck, supra note 135, at 254.  
230 Id. 
231 See D. KELLY WEISBERG, FAMILY LAW 147–49 (1999). See also 
Garrison, supra note 148, at 632.  
GUIDICE - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:13 PM 
 New York and Divorce 825 
investments in the marital home and/or childcare cannot simply 
walk away from the marriage without suffering economic 
destitution.232 Thus, spouses who foresee devoting their time to 
childcare or domestic management should negotiate the post-
divorce rules on permanent maintenance or property division by 
entering into pre or post marital agreement.233  
Interestingly, courts have come to regard the enforceability of 
premarital contracts as a natural consequence of the introduction of 
no-fault divorce.234 Prior to the widespread availability of no-fault 
divorce, courts feared that premarital agreements might provide 
incentive for a spouse to commit fault and exit his or her marriage 
without consequence. Because the terms of divorce were already 
provided for in a pre-nuptial contract, courts believed that the 
couple had little to fear from divorce and thus little reason to 
behave. However, in the wake of no-fault divorce regimes and 
Posner, courts have instead come to view premarital agreements as 
a straightforward way of resolving the financial issues of 
divorce.235 Therefore, premarital agreements should be interpreted 
as a corrective measure for the disadvantages inflicted by the 
decline of marriage through the already widespread availability of 
no-fault divorce.236  
By entering into premarital agreements prior to marriage, 
parties may insist on stronger rights to alimony or a larger share of 
marital property than is provided by the default rules.237 The fewer 
the rights to maintenance payments or to a share of the property 
                                                          
232 Franck, supra note 135, at 254. 
233 Id. at 260–61. 
234 Frey v. Frey, 41 A.2d 705, 709–10 (Md. 1984) (explaining that 
antenuptial agreements settling alimony or property rights of parties upon 
divorce are not per se against public policy and may be specifically enforced). 
“The old view’s fear that spouses could induce a divorce through fault, without 
consequences, because the terms of divorce were settled in a [premarital 
contract], is no longer persuasive because that spouse [can now] seek a no-fault 
divorce.” Id.; see also LAURA W. MORGAN & BRETT R. TURNER, ATTACKING 
AND DEFENDING MARITAL AGREEMENTS 33–34 (2001). 
235 Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, WIS. L. REV. 1443, 
1475 (1992).   
236 Franck, supra note 135, at 238.   
237 MORGAN & TURNER, supra note 234, at 35–36. 
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provided by the no-fault default rules, the more contractual 
protection seems appropriate.238 Therefore, with the advent of no-
fault divorce and the failure of New York courts to consider 
marital fault in the division of property and determination of 
maintenance awards, couples considering marriage should enter 
into premarital agreements. Negotiating the terms of a potential 
divorce may be the best route to a secure and equitable marriage.  
CONCLUSION 
The enactment of a no-fault divorce system is a positive 
development for New York’s Domestic Relations Laws. By 
eliminating the strict fault requirements for divorcing spouses, the 
law ensures that New Yorkers who wish to dissolve their marriage 
can do so without added time, expense, or perjury. Additionally, 
studies of no-fault jurisdictions illustrate other advantages to 
adopting unilateral divorce such as the decrease in incidents of 
domestic violence and lower rates of female suicide.239  
However, the passage of a no-fault divorce system in New 
York eliminates any bargaining leverage economically 
disadvantaged spouses have in the wake of divorce. Despite the 
fact that in some divorce cases there is assignable fault, New York 
courts fail to take this into account in awarding maintenance and 
dividing property.240 In light of the state’s adoption of unilateral 
divorce, New York courts must reevaluate the O’Brien standard 
that allows marital fault to be considered only in egregious cases 
that “shock the conscience.”241 Further, with the loss of fault as a 
negotiating tool, New Yorkers looking to protect themselves and 
their assets in the wake of divorce should seek alternative solutions 
such as premarital agreements. 
                                                          
238 Franck, supra note 135, at 262.    
239 See, e.g., The Editors, supra note 1 (discussing various pros and cons of 
no-fault divorce).  
240 Pappas, supra note 162.     
241 O’Brien v. O’Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 589 (N.Y. 1985). 
